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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS C. MABEY and LOUISE S.
MABEY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
Case No. 18338
WASATCH CABINET COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action involving opposing claims by the Plaintiffs
Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey and the Defendant Kay Peterson Construetion Company, Inc. against each other.

Plaintiffs Mabeys' claims

were for damages resulting from breach of a written contract and breach
of warranty in connection with the construction and sale of a home.
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc. also claimed damages
for breach of contract and included an additional request for equitable
relief in the form of contract reformation.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

At the conclusions of trial, the

court found that the written contract between the Plaintiffs and Defendant
was formed under a mutual mistake of fact.

Having so found, the court,

rather than reforming the contract to conform to the parties intention and
understanding, simply entered judgment in favor of both the Plaintiffs
Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey and the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction
Company, Inc.

The court also entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs

on their claims for breach of warranty.

From the court's judgment this

appeal has been taken by the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company,
Inc.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of that portion of the judgment entered
in favor of the Plaintiffs Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey, together with
modification of that portion of the judgment entered in favor of the
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc. to conform said portion
of the judgment to the undisputed evidence adduced at trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The central issue in this case concerns the preparation and execution
of a written contract (Pl.Ex.C) between the Plaintiffs Thomas C. and
Louise S. Mabey (Respondents herein) and the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc. (Appellant herein) for the purchase of a home
constructed by the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc.

For
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convenience the parties will be hereafter referred to as "Mabeys" (or
individually as "Tom Mabey", "Louise Mabey") and "Kay Peterson Construction" or "the Construction Company."
found at the close

The court properly and correctly

of the trial proceedings that there had been a

mutual mistake of fact in the formation and preparation of the written
contract (T-132).

However, rather than reform the contract so as to

reflect the parties' actual intentions, the court chose instead to
award damages to the Mabeys apparently for alleged breach of the contract by Kay Peterson Construction and to award damages to Kay Peterson
Construction allegedly resulting from the mutual mistake.
About three or four months prior to November, 1979 the Mabeys
and Mr. Kay Peterson on behalf of Kay Peterson Construction discussed
the possibility of building a home on Lot 1 Indian Springs Estates,
the property which is the subject of this litigation (T-40).

The

Mabeys understood that Kay Peterson Construction would build a house
on that lot and if the house met with their approval they would purchase
it (T-43,44).
Sometime thereafter in the fall of 1979, Kay Peterson Construction began construction of a home on Lot 1 (T-40) .

The construction

loan for the home was obtained by Kay Peterson Construction from
Mountain West Savings and Loan.

The lot itself was owned at the time

by a corporation named Mountain West Development.

There was also an

underlying mortgage on the lot in favor of Zion's Mortgage Corporation.

-3-
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When the construction loan commitment was secured a check in the amount of
$18,500 was drawn from the construction loan fund to obtain a release from
Zion's Mortgage on behalf of Mountain West Development.

Title to the lot

was then put up as security on the construction loan (T-86,87,117,122).
Mountain West Development eventually received $27,000 for the lot, the
money being disbursed through Mountain West Savings & Loan and distributed
partly to Mountain West Development with the remainder to Zion's Mortgage
as described above (T-86,87).
The plans to be followed in the construction of the home were submitted to Kay Peterson Construction by Tom Mabey.

Mr. Mabey had acquired

the plans out of a plan book and had made substantial modifications and
changes therein before he submitted them to the Construction Company (T35, 41).

During the course of construction of the home, the Mabeys added

their input.

The Mabeys sub-contracted and paid separately for the

plumbing (T-25,46); they installed the insulation themselves, took care
of clean up and paid separately for the security system and some railing
which were included in the home (T-25); they were consulted by Kay Peterson
Construction concerning the orientation of siding on the exterior surf ace
of the home (T-47), the location of a basement window (T-48), the addition
of a fireplace (T-49) , the framing of the bathtub and the facing installed
around it (T-50,51).

The Mabeys selected the color of paint, the location

and design of cabinets and light fixtures and the carpeting for the home
(T-37) .

They also obtained a commitment from Mountain West Savings and

-4-
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Loan for a loan to purchase the home (T-14,Pl.Ex.A).

Notwithstanding

this not inconsiderable involvement in the construction phase of the
home, it was the Mabey's understanding that they were neither committed
nor obligated in any way to purchase the home once it was built (T-53).
Around the middle of March, 1980, construction was nearing completion.

In order to facilitate the financing of the home through

Mountain West Savings and Loan, Torn Mabey prepared in his own hand a
written contract on a standard Earnest Money Receipt form (Pl.Ex.C,
T-58).

For convenience this contract will be referred to hereinafter

as "the Earnest Money Contract."

In connection with the preparation

of the Earnest Money Contract, Torn Mabey asked Mr. Kay Peterson, the
president of Kay Peterson Construction, for an estimate of the cost
of the completed project (T-58).

In turn, Mr. Peterson asked the

company bookkeeper, Mrs. Squires, to prepare the estimate from the
Construction Company's records (T-97,115).

Mrs. Squires prepared

the estimate from the construction draw records of Kay Peterson Construction and as to unfinished items, from the supplier's bids or
the original cost estimates (T-97, 103) .

Mrs.· Squires' estimate sheet

became the document referred to on the face of the Earnest Money
Contract as the "Projected Cost Estimate", Exhibit A.

This document

was incorporated into and became the third page attached to the
Earnest Money Contract (Pl.Ex.C,T-95,96).
The "Projected Cost Estimate" showed $77,565.00 as the amount of

-5-
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the "Loan Disbursed to Date," unpaid bills of $12,734.96 and estimated
completion costs on the remaining items of $43,768.44 to arrive at an
overall cost estimate for the construction of $134,068.40.

This figure

included an item on line 37 designated "Lot Payoff - $9,000.00."

Mrs.

Squires, a reliable and experienced employee, gave the estimate to Mr.
Peterson who, in turn, delivered ot ti Mr. Mabey (T-58,115).

Upon re-

ceipt of the estimate, Mr. Mabey prepared the first page of the Earnest
Money Contract (on the standard Earnest Money Receipt form), and set the
total cost figure at $136,000 to accord Mr. Peterson approximately a
$2,000 "buffer" against cost-overruns on the estimated figures (T-27,58,63).
The Earnest Money Contract provided in part that it covered only the
home and the improvements which had been constructed, and not the lot
itself (Pl.Ex.C,T-119).

The lot was acquired by the Mabeys through a

purchase and trade with a third party.

In other words, the lot was pur-

chased by a Mr. Jerry James, who then traded the lot to the Mabeys in
exchange for interests of the Mabeys in other property (Pl.Ex.BiT-18,19,116).
This exchange took place because the Mabeys believed they would not be
able to afford to buy the home if the cost of the lot ($27,000)

(T-61,

86,87) were included in the purchase price and had to be financed also
(T-18,19,39).
During his review of the cost estimate sheet prepared by Mrs. Squires
and in his discussions with Mr. Peterson, Tom Mabey was concerned that
the lot price of $27,000.00 might be incorrectly included in the total cost
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shown on the sheet (T-60).

He placed a question mark adjacent to line

37 which read "lot payoff:

$9,000," wrote in the margin directly above

that "was remaining $18,000 . . . " and drew an arrow to the figure on
line 1 of the sheet which read "Loan Disbursed to Date:
61).

3/5/80" (T-60,

He asked Mr. Peterson whether the $18,000 balance (i.e., the

difference between the "lot pay off" figure of $9,000 and the $27,000
lot price) was included in the "Loan Dispursed to Date 3/5/80" figure
of $77,565 (T-60).

Both Mr. Mabey and Mr. Peterson were aware that

the underlying mortgage on the lot in favor of Zion's Mortgage had
been satisfied by an advance in the approximate sum of $18,000 from
the construction loan proceeds (T-60,61).

Although Mr. Peterson had

not supervised the preparation of the ·cost estimate or discussed it
with his bookkeeper, he honestly believed the advance to be covered
in that figure and told Mr. Mabey that it was so included (T-61).

On

this basis, and since the Earnest Money Contract was to cover the home
only, the parties agreed to reduce the price shown on the Earnest Money
Contract by $27,000, the full price of the lot, rather than only by
$9,000, the lot payoff figure shown on line 37 of the cost estimate
(T-61,62).

The concluding paragraph of the Earnest Money Contract

was then altered by Tom Mabey to read as follows:
The purchase price is based on all costs relative to the
construction of the dwelling as per plans and specifications
plus an $8,500.00 Seller's profit. However, the total
cost shall be based on the projected cost estimate, Exhibit
A, attached and hereby made a part of this agreement, and
in no event shall said total cost exceed ~i3e 7 999 $109,000.00
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unless agreed upon in writing by both Buyer and Seller.
The reduction of the price term was initialled by the parties and reflected the deletion of the price of the lot, which both parties believed
to be included in the cost estimate attached to the Earnest Money Contract
as Exhibit A (T-62,116).
In fact, Mrs. Squires omitted to include the additional $18,000 for the
lot in computing the figures shown on the "Projected Cost Estimate" (T-118) .
Mr. Peterson believed this figure was included, as did Mr. Mabey, at the
time the contract was executed.

It was precisely because of this mutual

understanding that the Earnest Money Contract price was reduced by $27,000
instead of $9,000 (T-62,118).

When Mr. Peterson discovered the mistake,

he immediately contacted Tom Mabey and brought it to his attention.

How-

ever, the latter refused to rescind or correct the contract and arranged
to close the loan transaction with his bank based .on the figures shown on
the Earnest Money Contract (T-27,28,118).
When the funds acquired from the bank based on the mistaken contract
purchase price had been distributed, Kay Peterson Construction was unable
to pay all of the suppliers and sub-contractors on the home.

These material-

rnen and sub-contractors then filed liens against the Mabey's home and
initiated actions for payment (T-28;R-46 through R-140).

When the Mabeys

learned of the outstanding and unpaid liens, they brought the action in
the lower court captioned Thomas C. Mabey and Louise

s.

Mabey v. Kay

Peterson Construction Company, Inc., Civil No. 1-28199 to recover against
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Kay Peterson Construction.

The lien claims on the home were consolidated

in the action styled Wasatch Cabinet Co., Inc. v. Kay Peterson, et al.,
Civil No. 2-28838.

The Mabeys then arranged to compromise and satisfy

the outstanding liens and borrowed funds from Zion,. s Bank to make payment thereon (T-28,29;Pl.Ex.G).

By the time of trial all liens had

been settled and the only claims outstanding in the Wasatch action were
cross-claims between the Mabeys and Kay Peterson Construction which
were identical to the complaint and counterclaims contained in the
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction action.

Therefore, the two cases

were consolidated for trial (R-26,175).
At the conclusion of the trial, the court ruled that the Earnest
Money Contract had been formed under a mutual mistake of fact.

The

court then awarded judgment to Kay Peterson Construction based on the
amount originally demanded in the counterclaim
Peterson Construction.

fil~d

on behalf of Kay

The court also awarded judgment to the Mabeys

for the amount expended by them to satisfy the unpaid lien claims,
together with damages for the.interest they paid on the loan and
attorney's fees (T-132,133).
The court also awarded damages in the sum of

$5,400.00 to the

Mabeys for the alleged failure of Kay Peterson Construction to complete construction on certain items in the home in a quality workmanlike manner (T-132) .

While no detailed list of defects was contained

in the complaint, the complaint did allege generally defects in workmanship and request an award of damages in the sum of $5,440.00 (R-2).
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At trial Mabeys introduced two written exhibits in support of the
claim for defects.

The first was a letter dated October 8, 1980 from

Tom Mabey to his attorney, Mr. Diumenti, listing seventeen (17) claimed
defects in construction (Pl.Ex.H).
and styled "Correction Report."

The second was dated November 4, 1981

This document contained a list of

only ten (10) claimed defects in construction (Pl.Ex.I).

Tom Mabey testi-

fied that there were now no items other than those shown on the "Correction Report" (PloEx.I) which he alleged were deficient (T-31,32).

Mr.

Diumenti also represented to the court that his client was only claiming
the right to recover on the ten (10) alleged defects in the inspection
report, not_ the seventeen (17) listed in the earlier letter (T-67).

The

court accepted the exhibits for informational purposes only and not as
proof of the truth of what was recited therein (T-73) .
In chambers and before trial, counsel for Mabeys had represented
to the court that the Utah State Department of Contractors had found
at a hearing conducted just several days before trial on November 25,
1981 some workmanship in the home to be defective and that the Department had issued an order to that effect which required the defects to be
corrected.

The court apparently believed this to constitute a prior

adjudication of these claims, notwithstanding the fact that counsel for
Kay Peterson Construction advised the court that neither he nor his
client were aware of any such order by the Department of Contractors.
During the trial, the court alluded to this earlier meeting in chambers
and proceeded to sustain evidentiary objections and limit the scope of
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examination related to the alleged defects (T-31,66).
The only evidence submitted at trial concerning the damages resulting from the alleged ten (10) defects was the testimony of Tom
Mabey who stated that he estimated the total cost to repair the
alleged defects, based upon the cost of materials and an hourly
charge of $17.00 per hour, would be $5,400.00 (T-34,35).

No addi-

tional details as to the breakdown or manner of calculation were
provided.
Following the trial counsel for Kay Peterson Construction submitted objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law prepared by Mr. Diurnenti.

Attached thereto was an affidavit

from Steven Schwendimen of the Attorney General's office which set
forth that the "Inspection Report" (Pl.Ex.I) was nothing more than
a form of complaint to which Kay Peterson Construction was required
to respond.

No determination relative to the validity or accuracy

of the alleged defects contained therein had been made (R-204) .
Following a hearing on the objections, the court signed the
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment as proposed
without further comment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
HAVING CORRECTLY AND PROPERLY FOUND THAT
THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT IN THE FORMATION
AND EXECUTION OF THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT REFORMING
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THE CONTRACT TO CONFORM TO THE INTENTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF
THE PARTIES.
It has long been the law in Utah that upon finding that a written
instrument, due to a mutual mistake of fact, does not reflect the actual
intention or understanding of the parties, the court will reform the
instrument and enter judgment according to the terms of the instrument
as reformed.

The rule of law was applied by this court in Intermountain

Farmer's Association v. Peart, 30 Utah 2d 201, 515 P.2d 614 (1973) to
reform a deed from the plaintiff to the defendants and decrease the amount
of property conveyed from five acres to two acres upon a showing that
the plaintiff intended to convey only two acres and the defendants expected to receive no more.
The rule was also found applicable in Jensen v. Manilla Corporation
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63 (Utah,
1977) to increase the amount of property sold under a real estate contract
when it was established at trial that the purchaser, Jensen, thought he
was buying and the real estate agent for the seller, the Church, thought
he was selling all of a certain parcel of property located between two
existing fence lines, even though the contract for sale failed to include
in its description the south 32 feet of the property and this same 32 foot
parcel had been subsequently conveyed by the Church to a third party.

In

affirming the reformation of the contract by the trial court, this court
cited with approval from Powell on Real Property:
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The power to obtain reformation of a written instrument
exists when i t can be satisfactorily proved (1) that the
instrument as made failed to conform to what both parties
intended; . . .
6 Powell on Real Property §903 at 268.8-.10(1977)
Id at 64
This court also noted that parol evidence is specifically admissible to show that a writing does not conform to the intent of
the parties,

Id at 64; cf: Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d

571 (1951), Janke v. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P.2d 933 (1958).
The rule of reformation has been extended by this court to reform not only specific terms of written instruments as demonstrated above,
but

also

documents.

the

entire character of a written document or series of

In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah, 1975) the

plaintiff, Kesler, was the purchaser on contract of a 480 acre tract
of land and a nearby 318 acre tract, the contract for sale of which
smaller tract included cattle and other personal property.

Convey-

ances from the sellers for all of the real and personal property were
held in escrow, pending performance by Kesler.
approached by one

Kesler was then

Kershaw, who wished to acquire only the 480 acre

parcel and after some negotiation Kesler and Kershaw entered into
an agreement to sell the 480 acre tract.

Since the documents evidencing

title to the property were held in an escrow under Kesler's contract
of purchase, the parties agreed that Kesler would assure marketable
title in the 480 acre parcel by giving Kershaw a security interest
in all the escrow property, which security interest would terminate
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as to the 318 acre parcel and personal property upon transfer of title
to the 480 acre parcel.

By mistake the documents used to facilitate the

transaction recited simply that all the property was conveyed to Kershaw.
When Kershaw subsequently sold all of his holdings to the defendant Rogers,
the documents evidencing the sales transaction between Kershaw and Rogers
were not prepared to reflect the understanding between Kesler and Kershaw
concerning the security interest arrangement; instead the documents perpetuated the erroneously prepared language from the earlier transactiono
Shortly after the sale was completed, Rogers, with the aid of several
other people, siezed a number of cows from Kesler, claiming ownership under
the written agreements with Kershaw.
In affirming the trial court's judgment, which reformed the documents
of conveyance into documents reflecting the intended security agreement
and awarded Kesler damages against Rogers for the wrongful taking of his
cattle, this court recited the basic rule for reformation of instruments:
[A]s between the immediate parties, where the terms
of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not
show what the true intent and agreement between the parties
was, it may be reformed to show that intento
Id at 358
The clear and undisputed facts adduced at the trial of this action
establish, and the trial judge properly ruled, that the price term in
the written contract between the Plaintiffs Mabey and the Defendant Kay
Peterson Construction (the Earnest Money Contract - Pl.Ex.C) was erroneously formulated under a mutual mistake of fact.

The parties intended that
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the Earnest Money Contract should reflect the purchase price of the
home only, and not the lot on which i t was constructed.

Both parties

honestly, but mistakenly, believed that the cost breakdown sheet
attached to the Earnest Money Contract as Exhibit A included the
entire $27,000 cost of the lot, $9,000 shown as a "lot payoff" figure
on line 37, the remaining $18,000 included as part of the "Loan Disbursed to Date" figure of $77 ,565.00 on line 1.

Both parties agreed

to reduce the price shown on line 53 of the first page of the Earnest
Money Contract by $27,000, from $136,000 to $109,000, mistakenly believing that by so altering the Earnest Money Contract they were
accurately setting forth their intention to show only the cost of the
home on the contract.

In fact, the $18,000 payment advanced by the

bank from the construction loan to pay off the prior

mortgage had

not been included by the Defendant's bookkeeper, Mrs. Squires, when
she prepared the cost breakdown sheet.

In order to accurately reflect

the intention and understanding of the parties, the $136,000 purchase
price initially shown on the Earnest Money Contract should have been
reduced by only $9 ,000 (the "lot payoff" figure on line 37 of the
cost estimate sheet) to $127,000, rather than reduced by the full
$27,000 to $109,000.
Having correctly determined that because of mutual mistake, the
Earnest Money Contract did not reflect the parties intention, the
trial court should have entered judgment reforming the price term
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of the contract and ordering it to be increased from $109,000 to $127,000.
Since the trial court did not, it behooves this august body to apply the
legal principles of reformation enunciated by this court in the foregoing
cited cases and require the trial court to so act.
As a final observation it should be noted that in cases involving
mutual mistake courts have on occasion awarded relief in the form of recision,

rather than reformation, of the written instrument.

See:

Ross v. Harding, 64 Wash.2d 231, 391 P.2d 526 (1964), Elsinore Union
Elementary School District v. Kastorff,
(1960) .

Cal.

, 353 P.2d 713

The Defendant Kay Peterson Construction urges this court to

consider that such a remedy would be entirely inappropriate here.
party has ever requested
over,

recision

Neither

of the Earnest Money Contract.

More-

the Mabeys have lived in the home which is the subject of the

contract since its completion in the spring of 1980 and have (presumably)
made payments during that period on the loans they obtained to purchase
the home.

To attempt at this time to undo the transaction rather than

reform it, would be to create additional, involved and unnecessary problems
concerning property valuation, payments made, reasonable rental value,
etc.

The Defendant Kay Peterson Construction requested reformation in its

counterclaim and in its case as presented at trial.
only damages.

Recision

The Mabeys claimed

would only exacerbate the difficulties created

by the parties' mistake, not resolve them.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AMEND DEFENDANT KAY PETERSON
CONSTRUCTION'S COMPLAINT AND IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN
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FAVOR OF DEFENDANT KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING TO THE
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL.
Once the trial court had properly concluded that there was a
mutual mistake of fact in the formation of the price term of the
Earnest Money Contract and the clear and undisputed evidence established
that the amount of the mistake was $18,000, the trial court was compelled under Rules 15(b) and 54(c) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to consider the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction's counterclaim amended, to conform it to the evidence presented and to enter
judgment accordingly on behalf of the Defendant Kay Peterson Construetion in the sum of $18,000.

The first part of Rule lS(b) provides:

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
by the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after the judgment;
but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues."
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 54(c) (1) provides in pertinent part:
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings.
(Emphasis added.)
In interpreting these rules, this court has continually emphasized
that the judgment of the trial court

should reflect proper applica-

tion of the law to the evidence and findings actually determined at
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tr.ial, regardless of the pleadings of the parties and the claims or
defenses which may or may not have been expressed therein.

In First

Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859 (Utah,
1979) this court reviewed the application of both Rule 15(b) and Rule
54(c) (1) and observed:
Whatever else may be said about whether it is mandatory or
discretionary under the rules just quoted to grant such a
motion to amend, it could not be made plainer that the
underlying purpose of the rules is that judgment shOUld be
granted in accordance with the law and the evidence as the
ends of justice require; and that this is true whether the
pleadings are actually amended or not.
Id at 861 (Emphasis added.)
In its examination of Rule 15(b), this court in General Insurance
Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d 502 (Utah,
1976) stated:
The purpose of an amendment to conform to proof is to bring
the pleadings in line with the actual issues upon which the
case was tried. There must, of course, be either express
or implied consent of the parties for the trial of issues
not raised in the pleadings. Implied consent may be found
where one party raises an issue material to the other party's
case; or where evidence is introduced without objection.
Significantly, the first part of Rule 15(b) is not permissive
in terms, for it provides that issues tried by express or implied consent shall be treated as if raised in the pleadings.
Even failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial
of these issues
Id at 506 (Emphasis added.)
See also:

Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 505 P.2d 295 (1973);

Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969);
Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah, 1978).
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At the trial of the case at bar no objection was raised by the
Plaintiffs Mabey to the testimony of Kay Peterson, the president of
the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction, concerning the innocent and
inadvertent omission of the $18,000 bank advance from the cost estimate attached to the Earnest Money Contract nor concering the mistaken
belief of the parties that the $18,000 payment was included in the cost
estimate.

In fact, Tom Mabey testified that he also believed the

$18,000 advance to be included in the figures shown on the cost
estimate sheet.

The only objection made by the Mabeys was in con-

nection with the business records of Kay Peterson Construction which
were introduced to establish that the $77,565.00 amount shown as
"Loan Disbursed to Date" on line 1 of the cost estimate sheet in fact
represented advances only for materials and labor and not the $18,000
lot payment, and the objection was made on the grounds of lack of
foundation (T-120,121).
(T-121) .

This objection was overruled by the court

No objection to this evidence was made on the grounds that

it was irrelevent or beyond or outside the scope of the pleadings.
It is clear from Rule 15{b) as explained in Carnicero, supra, and
from Rule 54(c) (1) as noted in Colonial Ford, supra, that the court
below was compelled at the close of trial to grant judgment to the
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction "in accordance with the law and
the evidence" Colonial Ford, supra at 861.

The trial court was re-

quired upon a finding of mutual mistake to enter judgment reforming the
price term of the Earnest Money Contract upwards by $18,000 from
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$109,000 to $127,000, and to award judgment to Kay Peterson Construction
for $18,000.
Notwithstanding the clear requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the law, the trial court awarded the Defendant Kay Peterson
Construction only the sum of $11,037.46, which was the exact same amount
originally requested in the counterclaim initially filed on behalf of
Kay Peterson Cosntruction against the Plaintiffs Mabey.

This court must

remedy the lower court's error and require entry of a judgment reforming
the Earnest Money Contract and awarding Kay Peterson Construction the
sum of $18,000.00.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFFS MABEY
FOR INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED.
At the conclusion of trial, having correctly determined there was a

mutual mistake of fact in the formation of the Earnest Money Contract, the
court then proceeded to render judgment both to the Defendant Kay Peterson
Construction and to the Plaintiffs Mabey (T-132,133).

The errors in

those aspects of the judgment for the Defendent Kay Peterson Construction
have been discussed previously in this brief.
With respect to the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs Mabey (and
excepting for the moment the award for the cost of repairs, which is
considered infra) , the court allowed judgment for (a) the payments made
by Plaintiffs Mabey to satisfy the oustanding liens on the home,

(b) the

interest accrued at 18% on the money borrowed by Mabeys to pay the liens
and (c) attorney's fees in the sum of $2,500.00.

The court did not offer
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an explanation of its basis or reasoning for any of the awards to
the Mabeys, other than to remark that the interest incurred by the
Mabeys on the money borrowed to pay the liens was "a valid claim"
(T-132).

While the award for moneys expended by the Mabeys to

satisfy outstanding liens could reasonably be considered a set-off
against the judgment that should have been entered in favor of Kay
Peterson Construction in reforming the Earnest Money Contract, in
view of the court's finding of mutual mistake, the additional awards
to the Mabeys are erroneous and must be reversed.
The key to a legally consistent judgment involves the clear
recognition that the parties' respective positions relative to the
Earnest Money Contract are not merely conflicting, but rather that
they are mutually exclusive.

The trial court's decision turned

upon the interpretation of the facts and circumstances
the formation and execution of the contract.

surroundi~g

The evidence presented

required the court to resolve the question of whether the Earnest
Money Contract provided for a $109,000.00 fixed price or whether,
due to mutual mistake, the·price term should be reformed to $127,000.00.
Most assuredly, one cannot have it both ways.

Plaintiffs Mabeys'

claims for damages were entirely premised upon the former contention,
whereas Defendant Kay Peterson Construction's position was based
upon the latter assertion.

That is to say, Mabeys' claims for breach

of contract and for damages in the form of reimbursement of the
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amounts paid in excess of the contract price to satisfy lien claimants
are valid only if the amounts they paid were actually in excess of the
contract price.

If they were not, then the Mabeys merely paid for the

improvements which they selected and received, there was no contract
breach by Kay Peterson Construction and Mabeys have no basis for complaint against the Construction Company.

Conversely, Defendant Kay

Peterson Construction's position is that there was an innocent mutual
mistake in determining the price term.

Consequently, the Earnest Money

Contract should be reformed to adjust the purchase price upward by
$18,000.00.

As so reformed, the contract price is in excess of the

amounts paid by the Mabeys for the house, regardless of whether those
payments were made directly to Kay Peterson Construction or to third
party lien claimants.

There can be, therefore, no breach of the Earnest

Money Contract by Kay Peterson Construction.
This conclusion
consequences.
(1)

is not merely an academic point; it has practical

They are:

If the Earnest Money Contract was not breached, then there

is no basis for an award of interest upon the amounts borrowed by the
Mabeys to pay the lien claimants, as the same would be, at best, consequential damages for a breach of contract.
(2)

If the Earnest Money Contract was not breached, then there is

no basis for an award of attorney's fees to the Mabeys, as the same must
be either predicated on a breach of the contract (Pl.Ex.3, lines 47 and 48)
or found to be consequential damages incurred in satisfying lien claimants.
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The undisputed evidence clearly supports the position that upon
reformation of the Earnest Money Contract to reflect the understanding
of the parties, there was no breach thereof by the Defendant Kay
Peterson Construction.

Adjusting the price term of the contract up-

wards by $18,000 from $109,000 to $127,000, and considering the
amounts paid by the Mabeys to satisfy the liens gives the following:
Erroneous Contract Price
Mistaken Exclusion from Price
Reformed Contract Price

$109,000.00
18,000.00
127,000.00

Amounts Paid by Mabeys
Paid to Kay Peterson
Construction
Paid to Lien Claimants
Total Paid

(118,737.00)

($109,000.00)
(
9,737.00)

Net Balance Due Under Contract

$

8,263.00

Not only are there no damages accruing to Mabeys under the reformed contract for payments in excess of the contract price, there
is an unpaid balance owing to Kay Peterson Construction.
that the lien claimants were not paid is obvious.

The reason

The Mabeys re-

ceived a mistaken windfall and ended up paying Kay Peterson Construetion $18 ,000 less than they should have.

Had Kay Peterson Construc.tion

received the correct amount, the materialmen and the sub-contractors
who filed liens would have been easily satisfied.

The fact that the

Mabeys paid the lien claimants directly, rather than through the
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction is not in itself a ground for
any complaint.

The question is whether the Mabeys paid more than
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the contract price.
they did not.

The answer is that, in view of the mutual mistake,

Indeed, they got something of a bargain.

Obviously in cases of mutual mistake there are two innocent parties.
Therefore, in determining who should bear the burden of the mistake, it
is appropriate to consider who obtained the benefits thereof.

The Mabeys

obtained and now enjoy the benefits of the labor and materials represented
by the lien claims they paid.

The cabinets, carpeting and other items

are in their home and are used by them daily.

It is hardly unfair that

they should be required to pay for them, and that is all they have done
by satisfying the lien claimants.

They may be disappointed by discovery

of the mistake, but they have not been injured.

Conversely, shifting

the burden to the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction merely adds insult
to injury.

Kay Peterson Construction received no benefit from the

goods and services represented by the lien claims.
the money they paid is the same.

But for the Mabeys'

Had they not paid it to the lien

claimants, they would owe it to Kay Peterson Construction under the
reformed contract and Kay Peterson Construction would owe the lien
claimants.

So it is ultimately inconsistent to reform the price term

of the Earnest Money Contract and then award damages on the basis of the
original contract price, as the trial court apparently attempted to do.
Once again, one cannot have it both ways.
In summary, this is not a case of off-setting errors, although it
may superficially appear to be so at first glance.

By reforming the
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Earnest Money Contract as must be done under these circumstances,
to remedy the parties' mutual mistake, the Mabeys' claim for breach
of contract must be extinguished.

That is to say, the Mabeys have

not been required to pay more than the reformed contract price.

If

there is no breach of the reformed contract terms, then there is no
basis for an award of attorney's fees to Mabeys, whether as consequential damages for settlement of lien claims or as direct compensation for services rendered in this action, and claims for interest
on the amounts ostensibly borrowed by the Mabeys to pay for the liens
must also be dismissed.

As there was no contract breach, there can

be no damages, much less consequential damages, attendant thereon,
and this court should so hold.
POINT II:
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF
WITH RESPECT TO DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
CLAIMED DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP, AND THE COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS ON THOSE CLAIMS.
It is axiomatic in the law that before a party may be awarded
a judgment for damages, sufficiently detailed and adequate evidence as
to the existence and the amount of damages and the manner of their
computation must be presented to the court. 22Arn. Jur. 2d Damages §22.
Failing the submission of proof which is of a nature that would allow
reasonable ascertainment of the basis for and amount of damages, the
court must deny an award of any more than nominal damages to the
complaining party.

Doyle v. McBee, 161 Colo. 130, 420 P.2d 247 (1966),
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B & B Farms, Inc. v. Matlock's Fruit Farms, Inc., 73 Wash.2d 146, 437
P.2d 178 (1968).

It should be observed that this rule requires reasonable

certainty in two separate and distinct factual areas:

first, it must be

reasonably certain that damages exist, i.e., the plaintiff must establish
by sufficient evidence that he has been damaged and that there is a
factual basis on which to award damages; and second, the amount of the
damages which the plaintiff has suffered must be susceptible to reasonable ascertainment.

Plaintiffs Mabey failed at trial to meet adequately

this standard of certainty in either area.
Turning first to an examination of that part of the rule which
concerns reasonable certainty in determining amount of damage, the Utah
Supreme Court has regularly adhered to and espoused the above-noted
"damage certainty rule" when determining whether the amount of a damage
award has been proper.

In Johnson v. Hughes, 120 Utah 50, 232 P.2d 362

(1951) , this court reviewed a lower court decision granting damages to
the plaintiff homeowners and against the defendant contractor resulting
from sub-standard workmanship in the construction of two homes.

In

examining the trial court record and for the most part sustaining the
judgment entered, the Supreme Court noted that damage amounts had been
individually itemized.

In other words, the total judgment entered was

based on the amounts separately determined by the trial court as necessary to repair each of the alleged defects.

Id, 232 P.2d at 364.

Never-

theless, this court reversed and remanded with respect to those elements
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of damage which had not been segregated, observing that an award of
damages required greater certainty than that provided by the unsegregated evidence.

Id at 366.

In Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962), a case
involving an alleged breach of a land sale contract, this court noted
that the measure of damages in a contract breach action is the market
value of the property at the time of the breach less the contract price
to the vendee.

In applying this rule the court referred to the need

for reasonable certainty in damage amount determinations:
• . . to recover damages plaintiff must prove not only that
she has suffered a loss, but must also prove the extent and
amount thereof. Furthermore, to warrant a recovery based on
the value of the property there must be proof of its value
or evidence of such facts as will warrant a finding of value
with reasonable certainty.
368 P.d. at 601 (Emphasis added.)
The rule of certainty in damage awards is conunon in other jurisdictions as well.

In Louis Lyster, General Contractor, Inc. v. Town

of Las Vegas, 75 N.M. 426, 405 P.2d 646 (1965) the New Mexico Supreme
Court reviewed a lower court damage award against a contractor based
upon a claim for breach of contract resulting from defects that appeared
in the construction of a sewage facility.

The court stated that:

If the defect is remediable from a practical standpoint,
recovery generally will be based on the market price of
completing or correcting the performance, and this will
generally be shown by the cost of getting work done or
completed by another person.
405 P.2d at 668 (Court's emphasis.)
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Noting that damages must be of the kind and character susceptible
to proof and the amount allowed must be subject to reasonable ascertainment, the court reversed the trial court's damage award

of $19,043.00

and remanded, pointing out that the only evidence as to the damage amount
adduced at trial was the testimony of T. E. Scanlon, an engineer, who
in response to counsel's inquiry stated that his estimate of cost to
repair the defects "was roughly twenty thousand dollars," Id at 667.
The court refused to allow an award based on evidence which it characterized as no more than a "rough

estimate."

Turning to the record in the case at bar, the sole evidence presented to establish the amount of damages for the alleged defects in
construction consisted of the following exchange between the Plaintiff
Tom Mabey and his own counsel, Mr. Diumenti, concerning the cost of
reparing the alleged defects:
Q
Do you have an idea of the cost of the materials,
whether it be mortar, nails, the electrical wiring, and the
amount of time necessary to effect those repairs?

A

Yes I do.

Q

And what is your estimate?

A

I have estimated about $5,400.00.

Q

And that is based on what hourly charge?

A
Well it's based about on an average of 14 to 20
dollars, about $17.00 an hour.

Q
Have you in estimating that, did you take into account
the economy of time, for instance, that while perfa-tape and
plaster is drying, somebody could be fixing an electrical doorbell?
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A

Yes I did.
[T-34,35 (Emphasis added.)]

No other evidence of any kind was presented to the court or exists
in the record to testablish the amount of the da.-rna.ges claimed.

The

testimony of Mr. Mabey that repair costs are "about $5,400.00" based
upon an average hourly wage of "about $17.00 an hour" clearly does not
meet the standard of this court and other courts, which standard requires proof or evidence as will warrant a finding of a damage amount
"with reasonable certainty."

Bunnell v. Bills, supra, Lyster, General

Contractor, Inc. v. Town of Las Vegas, supra.
As a further indication of the suspect and uncertain nature of
the testimony presented concerning the amount of claimed damages, it
should be noted that in Plaintiffs Mabeys' original complaint the
amount requested as damages for the alleged faulty construction was
$5,440.00 (R-2).

By the time of trial the number of alleged defects in

construction claimed by the Mabeys had been pared down from seventeen
itemized in a letter from Tom Mabey to his legal counsel (Pl.Ex.H) to
only ten shown on the Correction Report from the State Board of
Contractors (Pl.Ex.I).

Notwithstanding the fact that the number of

defects claimed by the Mabeys had been reduced at trial by more than
40%, Mr. Mabey's estimate of repair .costs ($5,400.00) for the items
shown on the Correction Report (see T-34) exceeded 99% of and was
only $40 less than the amount originally claimed in the complaint,
which, one must assume, was based on the original list of claimed
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defects in Mr. Mabey's letter!

Considering the substantial reduction

in the number of defects alleged from the time the complaint was filed
until the time of trial, the amazing similarity between the amount claimed
by Plaintiffs Mabey in their complaint and the amount expressed by Tom
Mabey while on the witness stand would lead one to conclude that in
testifying, either Mr. Mabey erroneously based his estimate for repairs
on the original list of alleged defects or else he simply increased his
estimate of repair cost for the remaining alleged defects as the length
of the list was reduced.

Regardless of the reasons or basis for Mr.

Mabey's testimony, when it is viewed and tested with the closeness required by the rules of law adhered to by this court, it must be found
inadequate to support the amount of damages awarded by the trial court.
Turning to that aspect of the certainty of damage rule which requires a party to show by sufficient and competent evidence that a
basis for an award of damages exists, a review of the trial transcript
and documentary evidence presented clearly demonstrates that here also,
the Mabeys failed to carry their burden.

At trial the Mabeys presented

two written documents containing lists of alleged defects in construction.

The first, a letter from Tom Mabey to Mr. Diumenti, his attorney,

(Pl.Ex.H) listed seventeen complaints concerning the construction of
the home.

The second, a legal-sized document styled "Correction Report"

(Pl.Ex.I} listed ten separate items.

These exhibits were admitted, but

due to objection from Defendant's counsel, they were admitted solely
for informational purposes, and not to establish the truthfulness of
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the allegations contained in the documents.

In other words, the trial

court ruled in receiving the exhibits that they were not evidence the
alleged defects actually existed or that the Defendant Kay Peterson
Construction was responsible or liable for their repair.

Therefore,

in order for the trial court to have properly awarded damages to the
Mabeys based upon defective workmanship, the evidence thereof must
have come from other documents or testimony.
The only other evidence presented to the court concerning the
alleged defects in construction was the testimony of Tom Mabey, who
vaguely stated that there were "inadequacies" and "deficiencies,"
which he wrote down on Plaintiff's Exhibit H, the excluded document
(T-29,30).

He also testified that agents from the State Department

of Contractors had inspected the home and made a list of what they
felt were "deficiencies" (T-31), which list was the excluded Plaintiff's Exhibit I.
No evidence of any kind was presented to show the cause of the
alleged defects or to connect or link them to the Defendant Kay
Peterson Construction.

For example, there was no evidence presented

to show whether the alleged roof leak was due to poor workmanship or
whether it resulted from improper design of the roof.

Remember it

was Tom Mabey who obtained, substantially modified and delivered the
construction plans to Kay Peterson Construction (T-41).

Mr. Mabey

admitted on cross-examination that some of the so-called "deficiencies"
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shown on the "Correction Report" (PLEx.I) were items left out of the
construction of the home because their inclusion would have violated
state building codes (T-68,69).
What is clear from a close review of the trial transcript is that
the trial court, relying on the representations of Plaintiffs' counsel
in chambers before trial, believed the "Correction Report" {Pl.ExeI) to
be a prior adjudication by the State Board of Contractors of the liability of the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction for repair of the
items listed on the report, notwithstanding the representations of
Defendant's counsel in chambers that neither he nor his client were
aware of any such order or judgment.

Moreover,

the lower court limited

the scope of examination and sustained objections to testimony and evidence, apparently in reliance on that belief.
Reference to the court's comments in this connection is instructive.

For example, when Mr. Ditunenti asked Mr. Mabey during his examina-

tion if there were additional defects in the home which were not ineluded in the Correction Report, the trial judge interrupted, stating:
Now Mr. Ditunenti if I understand your question, I think
the ground rules I laid in there was [sic] that anything other
than those that the Department said were deficient we would
not consider.
(T-31, lines 27-30) (Emphasis added.)
The exchange between the court and counsel at T-66 and T-67 again
reveals the thinking of the trial judge:
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THE COURT: I just limited Mr. Jensen from even
talking about anything in addition to that because if
this man comes in and says all these additional defects
are in this house, the State man has gone out and inspected and found only these defects in this house, I
said to Mr. Diumenti that you are not going to be able
to talk about all these things that you imagine are real
because the State didn't find it.
(Emphasis added.)
Contrary to the trial court's belief, the Correction Report was
not an adjudication of defects or contractor liability.

It was

nothing more than a form of complaint, used to initiate administrative proceedings before the State Board of Contractors.

Affidavit of

Steven Schwendiman (R204-206) .
In summary, a careful review of the trial transcript shows that
the Mabeys' claims of defective workmanship were based on vague
assertions, inaccurate characterization of documents and little else.
The certainty which must be present to sustain an award for damages
is clearly absent from the record.

The trial court's judgment must

be reversed.
POINT III:
THE COURT'S FINDINGS ON DAMAGES INCURRED BY DEFENDANT
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION RESULTING FROM THE MUTUAL MISTAKE
OF THE PARTIES AND DAMAGES INCURRED BY PLAINTIFFS MABEY
RESULTING FROM ALLEGED DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP
ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The standard for review of findings of fact in equity cases has
been enunciated by this court in countless appellate decisions, which
for the sake of brevity are not collected and cited here.

Rather,

a typical, but comprehensive explanation of that standard is excerpted:
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due to the advantaged position of the trial court we will
review its findings and judgments with considerable indulgence,
and will not disagree with and upset them unless the evidence
clearly preponderates against them, or the court has mistaken
or misapplied the law applicable thereto.
Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452,454 (Utah, 1975)
From the foregoing it is clear that this court will not overturn
lower court findings in equity cases which are supported by some evidence
and are in harmony with the law.
The trial court's findings relative to the equitable holding that
the Earnest Money Contract was formulated and executed under a mutual
mistake of fact are as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 17: That defendant Kay Peterson
Construction Company erred in the preparation of Exhibit A
upon which Exhibit the parties negotiated the purchase price
of the residence in the sum of $11,037.47 to its detriment.
Said error arose out of defendant Kay Peterson Construction
Company's omission from consideration a transaction concerning
the subject lot in November 1979.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 18: That prior to the 25th day of
March 1980, plaintiffs and defendant Kay Peterson Construction
Company reviewed and discussed Exhibit A and neither was aware
of the defendant's mistake. From which mistake defendant Kay
Peterson Construction Company suffered a loss in his contemplation of $11,037.37 [sic].
The difficulty with these findings is obvious on their face:

They

fail to consider at all the clear and undisputed evidence presented at
trial that it was the Earnest Money Contract in setting forth the purchase
price of the home only, that was executed under a mutual mistake of fact
(see Point I.A., supra).

Moreover, the findings recite that the amount

of damages resulting from the mistake was $11,037.47, an amount which
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nowhere appears in the trial proceedings.

(That number is the damage

amount requested in Defendant Kay Peterson Construction's original
counterclaim [R-16].)

The only evidence presented to the lower court

concerning the amount of the mistake (and hence, the amount of damages)
clearly establishes that figure as $18,000.00 (see Point I.B.,supra).
As noted above the standard for review on appeal requires only some
evidence to support findings.
whatsoever.

In this instance there is no evidence

The findings must be rejected by this court as inadequate

and incorrect.
As with the standard for review in equity cases, this court's
procedures for reviewing findings in actions at law have also been
stated many times.

Again, turning to just one such statement we read:

. • . on review we survey the evidence in the light favorable to the findings, which ever party they may favor; . • .
they will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported
by substantial evidence."
Bramel v. Utah State Road Conunission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 52,
465 P.2d 534 (1970)
While as in equity matters, this court attempts in actions at
law to view favorably the trial court's findings, the applicable
review standard is slightly higher.

The findings in an

law must be "supported by substantial evidence."

action at

Turning to the

lower court's findings in this action dealing with the recovery
at law by the Plaintiffs Mabey for damages resulting from faulty
workmanship, we note:
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FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 11: Defendant Peterson Construction Company
[si.c]
failed to complete the construction of the residence located
on the subject real property in a quality workmanlike fashion as
contemplated by the parties in respect to the following inadequacies:
See attached Exhibit A.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 12: As a result of defendant Kay
Peterson Construction Company's failure to complete the improvements in a quality workmanlike fashion as contemplated by the
parties, plaintiffs Mabey will be required to expend the sum of
$5,400.00 to remedy the inadequacies.
As has been explained and argued at some length in Point II of this
brief, the evidence presented by the Mabeys in support of their damage
claims falls considerably short of the standards necessary for proof
thereof.

Defendant Kay Peterson Construction submits that the same

difficulty afflicts the above findings.

The evidence presented (what

little there was) can hardly be found to meet a standard for review which
requires "substantial evidence."

The findings must be stricken.

CONCLUSION
At the close of trial, the lower court properly and correctly found
that there had been a mutual mistake in the formation of the Earnest
Money Contract entered into by the parties for the sale of the home.
Error arose, however, when the trial court failed to properly apply the
law to its findings.

This court must now rectify that error and require

(1) reformation of the Earnest Money Contract to reflect the parties'
intention and understanding,

(2) entry of a judgment in favor of the

Defendant Kay Peterson Construction which conforms to the evidence and
(3) reversal of the judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiffs Mabey

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-36-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for consequential interest and attorney's fees.
The judgment of the trial court for damages resulting from alleged
defects in construction does not find adequate support in the evidence
presented at trial, because the standard of certainty required for
damage awards was not met by the Plaintiffs Mabey.

This court must

reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court's findings concerning the mutual mistake of the
parties and the damages resulting from alleged construction defects
do not meet the standards for review expressed by this court and must
be rejected.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of June, 1982.
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